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In 1953, Congress established
the Small Business Adminis-
tration (SBA) to ensure the
provision of adequate capital
for the formation and growth
of the nation’s small businesses.1  Small busi-
ness investment companies (SBICs) are SBA-
chartered and -regulated financial intermediar-
ies that finance the activities of small business
through equity investments and loans.  While
traditional financial intermediaries such as
commercial banks provide loans to businesses,
they do not, in general, provide equity financ-
ing.  However, SBICs can simultaneously hold
the equity of and lend to a client commercial
firm.  SBICs obtain their funds primarily from
two sources—privately invested capital and
long-term debentures (leverage) guaranteed by
the SBA.  In this article, we analyze the perfor-
mance of 280 SBICs that were active at the
beginning of 1986.  Of these 280 SBICs, over
half, or 56 percent, had failed by 1993.  As of
September 1995, 189 SBICs were in liquidation,
with SBA-guaranteed debentures outstanding of
over $500 million.2  The U.S. General Account-
ing Office (GAO) estimated that only $200
million would ultimately be repaid (United
States General Accounting Office 1995).
While these absolute dollar losses are
small, the failure rates and the associated losses
per dollar of guaranteed debentures are quite
high compared with those of banks and thrifts
over the 1980–91 period.3  Because the SBA, a
government agency, provides funds directly to
SBICs and serves as a financial guarantor of
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securities sold by SBICs to third parties, tax-
payers’ funds are at risk.  As a result, policy-
makers and taxpayers have a stake in evaluat-
ing the economic performance of SBICs.  Such
a study can shed light on the impact of govern-
ment subsidization and loan guarantees on the
behavior of financial intermediaries.
Furthermore, the SBIC program enlarges
the permissible activities and investments of
banking organizations beyond those typically
permitted for their commercial bank and ven-
ture capital units.  Banking organizations own
and operate SBICs, as well as other venture
capital firms.  While traditional bank-owned
venture capital units can only own up to 5
percent of a small firm’s equity, SBIC units of
banking organizations can own up to 50 per-
cent of a small firm’s equity.  Thus, the SBIC
program gives banking organizations a way to
hold a substantial amount of commercial firms’
equity while simultaneously holding their debt.
Learning about how bank-owned SBICs oper-
ate may shed light on what could happen if the
restriction on bank ownership of shares in
commercial enterprises were relaxed.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 17
In previous research, Brewer and Genay
(1994, 1995) studied the profitability of SBICs
and documented a negative relationship be-
tween their use of SBA leverage and returns on
equity (ROE).  In this article, we extend this
work to consider the relationship between
various financial factors and SBIC failure, as
well as the relationship between those factors
and ROE, with special attention paid to the
roles played by SBA leverage and SBICs’
investment choices.  We find that the relation-
ship between failure and SBA leverage is posi-
tive and that between ROE and SBA leverage
is negative.  Poor short-term performance, as
measured by ROE, does not necessarily imply
losses to the taxpayers.  Losses are incurred
only when an SBIC experiences sustained
losses over time and is unable to meet its obli-
gations.  For this reason, we also use a long-
term measure of SBIC performance, specifical-
ly whether an SBIC fails or survives, to assess
the relationship between SBA funding and the
performance of SBICs.
Because Brewer and Genay (1994, 1995)
found evidence that bank-owned SBICs dif-
fered significantly from nonbank-owned
SBICs, we also consider whether the SBA
leverage-performance relationship differs
between bank-owned and nonbank-owned
SBICs.  We find that, compared with non-
bank-owned SBICs, bank-owned SBICs had
higher ROEs and lower SBA leverage use,
and their investments in small businesses
were more likely to be in equity form and to
be intended for projects requiring careful
monitoring, such as research and development
and marketing projects.  We also find that the
significant negative relationship between SBA
leverage and ROE differs between the two
types of SBICs.  When leverage is measured
by an SBIC’s ratio of SBA-guaranteed debt to
total assets, both bank- and nonbank-owned
SBICs exhibit a strong, negative relationship
between ROE and leverage—high leverage
use is associated with low ROE.  Using an
alternative leverage measure, the ratio of
SBA-guaranteed debt to private capital, yields
similar results.  But when leverage is mea-
sured by the change in SBA funding relative
to assets, the negative relationship remains
significant only for nonbank-owned SBICs.
The lack of correlation between leverage and
ROE for bank-owned SBICs holds, even
when we examine only those bank-owned
SBICs that have positive SBA leverage.  This
suggests that the perceived costs and benefits
of using SBA subsidies differ across SBIC
types.  Our findings for SBIC failure rates are
broadly similar to those for ROE.  In particu-
lar, we find that the likelihood of an SBIC
failure increases with SBA leverage, though
our results are somewhat sensitive to the defi-
nition of failure.
Our findings that ROE decreases and the
likelihood of failure increases with SBA lever-
age are consistent with 1) the notion that risky
SBICs are more likely to make greater use of
SBA funding than other investment companies
(adverse selection); 2) the tendency for firms
with government liability guarantees to invest
excessively in risky assets (moral hazard); 3)
the prepayment effect, stemming from an SBA
restriction that limited the ability of SBICs to
refinance their SBA debt; and 4) the mismatch
effect resulting from using SBA debt to finance
equity investments.  We offer some evidence
on these explanations, but we cannot defini-
tively quantify the relative importance of each.
However, our research suggests that govern-
ment subsidization of activities to fund small
businesses can have unintended consequences
if the assets financed by the subsidized interme-
diaries are riskier than they would be in the
absence of the subsidies.
The SBIC program
The SBIC program was established in
1958 and is administered by the SBA.4  The
goal of the program is to encourage the provi-
sion of long-term capital to small firms, de-
fined as firms having less than $6 million in
net worth or a two-year average net income of
less than $2 million. A company can be licensed
as an SBIC if it satisfies a minimum capital
requirement of $1 million.  SBICs can be orga-
nized as corporations or partnerships and can
be owned by individuals or other firms, includ-
ing banking organizations.
Investment companies are eligible to receive
subsidized funds through the issuance of de-
bentures which are purchased directly or are
guaranteed by the SBA.  These debentures are
usually of ten years duration.  Each SBIC can
receive up to $3 in SBA funds for every $1 of
private capital, up to a maximum of $35 million.5
The SBA’s creditor position on debentures is fullyECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 18
subordinated to all third-party creditors of the
SBIC.  Furthermore, if an SBIC is organized as
a partnership, the general partner of the firm, in
general, is not liable for the debt.6  However, as
a condition of receiving funds, the SBA may
require a general partner to guarantee the repay-
ment of SBA debt.  Finally, during the period
under review, SBICs could not prepay their
SBA-held or -guaranteed debt during the first
five years of issue.
SBICs provide both equity capital and
long-term loans to small firms.  However,
they are subject to certain restrictions on their
investments.  SBICs cannot invest in certain
sectors, such as real estate, or foreign firms,
and, in general, they cannot provide short-
term financing.  If an SBIC makes an equity
investment in a small firm, it cannot acquire a
controlling interest without a plan of divesti-
ture.7   SBICs owned by banking organizations
face the same regulations on equity invest-
ments as other SBICs.  The SBA also places
restrictions on the maturity and interest rate of
loans made by SBICs.  The minimum maturi-
ty allowed is five years; the maximum interest
rate that can be charged to small businesses is
based on the interest rate on debentures issued
by the SBICs.8
SBICs are subject to annual examinations
by the SBA and certain reporting requirements,
such as reporting their financial condition
annually.  They also are required to provide
documentation on each investment they make
in a small business.  For instance, SBICs are
required to provide information certifying that
the firm meets SBA size standards and describ-
ing the financial condition of the firm.
In addition to these oversight regulations,
SBICs using SBA leverage are subject to capi-
tal requirements.  The SBA determines that an
SBIC has serious financial problems if the sum
of its net realized losses plus net unrealized
losses on securities held exceeds 50 percent of
its capital.  If an SBIC is capital impaired by
this test, the SBA gives the firm an opportunity
to correct its weak capital condition.  If the
SBIC fails to correct the capital impairment or
defaults on its payments, the entire SBA debt
may be declared immediately payable.  Under
these circumstances, or if there is another vio-
lation of the loan agreement or any agreement
with the SBA, the SBIC is liquidated or its
license is revoked.
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A. Returns on equity, 1986-91
B. Failure rates, 1987-93
Notes: Average failure rates = 11.24 percent for
SBICs; 5.50 percent for S&Ls; and 1.13 percent for
commercial banks.  For SBICs, failure is defined as
liquidation or revocation of an SBIC’s license by
the SBA or surrender of license by an SBIC.
Sources: Authors’ calculations from data provided by
the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA), the
Office of Thrift Supervision, and in various issues of
the FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile.
Overview of performance and leverage
The data used in this article are for 280
SBICs active at the beginning of 1986, which
filed reports of both condition and invest-
ments.9  The reports of condition provide detailed
balance-sheet and income-statement informa-
tion of SBICs for the 1986–91 period.10  The
investment data provide the name, SIC code,
total assets, number of employees, and location
of the firms being financed; the dollar amount
and type of financing provided (loans, equity,
or debt with equity features); whether there
was a put option on the equity financing that
requires the small firm to repurchase its equity
in the future; whether the deal included debtFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 19
Factors affecting SBIC performance
Why should SBA leverage influence re-
turn on equity (ROE) and the likelihood of
failure, and what other factors may explain
SBICs’ weak earnings and failure?  How might
access to SBA subsidies affect the returns on
capital invested in SBICs?  One would expect
that borrowing money at a subsidized rate
would raise the returns to private investors.  If
there are no market imperfections, then inves-
tors will invest in SBICs until their risk-adjust-
ed (post-subsidy) rates of return equal those
available in other financial intermediaries.
This means more projects would be funded
financing; the interest rate charged; the activity
that was being financed; variables that indicate
whether the SBIC previously provided financing
to the firm; and whether the SBIC offered man-
agement services to the small business.
Figure 1 provides a comparison of several
measures of performance for our sample of
SBICs versus other financial institutions over
the 1986–91 period.  In brief, SBICs performed
poorly over this period.  Panel A of figure 1
shows that SBICs experienced very low ROEs
between 1986 and 1991 and performed worse
than commercial banks.  SBICs’ returns on
equity were negative (–0.2 percent) over the
1986–91 period, and were positive for only
two of the six years.  Panel B of figure 1 re-
ports the failure rates for sampled SBICs and
other financial institutions.  The failure rate for
SBICs was a little above 11 percent per year,
compared with 5.5 percent for savings and loan
associations and 1 percent for commercial
banks.11  Over 56 percent of the 280 SBICs
were liquidated, had their licenses revoked, or
voluntarily surrendered their licenses prior to
the end of 1993.
Figure 2 shows that bank-owned SBICs
performed significantly better than their non-
bank-owned counterparts.12  Bank-owned
SBICs had a mean ROE of 1.9 percent over the
1986–91 period, while nonbank-owned SBICs
earned a –1.5 percent ROE.  Failure rates dif-
fered as well:  41.4 percent of bank-owned
SBICs had failed by 1993, while the compa-
rable figure for nonbank-owned SBICs was
64.1 percent.  The difference in failure rates is
even greater if failure is defined to include
only liquidations and license revocations.
Figures 3 and 4 show that SBA leverage
was used by a majority of the SBICs in our
sample, but it also reveals two other aspects of
SBA leverage usage.  First, nonbank-owned
SBICs are much more likely to use SBA lever-
age than bank-owned SBICs (figure 3).  Conse-
quently, the mean ratio of SBA funds to total
assets is much lower for bank-owned SBICs than
for nonbank-owned SBICs (figure 4, panel A).
Second, conditional on using any SBA lever-
age at all, bank-owned SBICs still used less
leverage than their nonbank-owned counter-
parts, and their usage declined over the period
under review (figure 4, panel B).  It is clear from
these figures that, by and large, bank-owned
SBICs are not exploiting the SBA financing
subsidy to the same extent as other SBICs.
Performance of bank- and
nonbank-owned SBICs
FIGURE 2
A. Returns on equity, 1986-91
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percent active at beginning of year that failed by year-end
Notes: Average ROEs = 1.9 percent for bank-owned
SBICs; –1.5 percent for nonbank-owned SBICs; and
–0.2 percent for all SBICs.  Average failure rates = 41.4
percent for bank-owned SBICs; 64.1 percent for
nonbank-owned SBICs; and 56.1 percent for all SBICs.
Failure is defined as liquidation or revocation of an
SBIC’s license by the SBA or surrender of license by
an SBIC.
Source: Authors’ calculations from data provided by
the U.S. Small Business Administration.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 20
Finally, aside from these two information-
related concerns, we consider the prepayment
effect and the mismatch effect.  The SBA regu-
lations in effect during the period under review
essentially forbade prepayment of SBA-guar-
anteed debt during its first five years; hence,
SBA regulations matched the minimum dura-
tion of SBICs’ debt and the loans they made.
Thus, falling interest rates could mean a de-
cline in investment income but no commensurate
decline in interest expenses, putting pressure on
SBICs’ profits.  This prepayment effect would
likely be most pronounced for SBICs with
large loan portfolios.13  A second factor is that
SBA leverage required regular interest pay-
ments to the SBA, whether or not the SBIC
earned any income over that period.  Thus,
many SBICs, especially equity-oriented SBICs
whose realized income consists primarily of
variable capital gains, may have found SBA
leverage quite burdensome—the mismatch effect.
Overall, then, we have several reasons to expect
that SBA leverage may be negatively related to
ROE and positively related to failure.
The relationship between ROE (and failure)
and SBA leverage is obviously a complex one.
We consider three measures of SBA leverage.
The first measure, the ratio of total SBA funds
to total assets (SBATA), is a good indicator of
how an SBIC is funding its assets; that is,
whether it is funding a large or small fraction of
its assets with publicly subsidized funds.  The
second leverage measure, the ratio of total SBA













than would be the case in a world without SBA
subsidies.  However, if only the riskiest SBICs —
those that would otherwise be unable to raise
funds or could do so only at a hefty risk premi-
um—use leverage, then this adverse selection
problem may mean we observe a positive rela-
tionship between failure and SBA leverage.
Further, if SBICs that use SBA leverage do
so because they intend to invest in riskier
projects than they would if only their own mon-
ey were at stake, this moral hazard may also
point to a positive relationship between failure
and leverage.
FIGURE 4
SBA leverage, 1986 and 1991
A. Unconditional means of
SBA funds/total assets
B. Means of SBA funds/total assets
















Source: Authors’ calculations from data provided by the U.S. Small Business Administration.
Source: Authors’ calculations from data provided by
the U.S. Small Business Administration.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 21
funds to private capital (SBAPRIV), gives a sense
of the extent to which the SBIC’s own dollars
are at stake relative to subsidized dollars.
Thus, SBAPRIV may be a better measure of the
possibility of moral hazard problems arising.
The SBA implicitly recognized this possibility
when it developed regulations limiting the
amount of leverage to $3 of publicly subsidized
capital for every $1 of privately provided capi-
tal.  Our third leverage measure, DSBATA, is
defined as the net change in SBA funding rela-
tive to total assets.  Holding other things con-
stant, we expect that ROE should decrease and
the likelihood of an SBIC failure should in-
crease with SBA leverage.  Thus,
1) ROE  = f(SBALEV, CONTROL VARIABLES, e)
and
2) FAILURE = g(SBALEV, CONTROL
VARIABLES, m),
where SBALEV captures the extent to which
an SBIC uses SBA funds; FAILURE is an
indicator variable which is equal to one if an
SBIC is liquidated, voluntarily surrenders its
license, or has its license revoked, zero other-
wise; CONTROL VARIABLES is a set of addi-
tional variables influencing ROE and SBIC
failure; and e and m are identically and inde-
pendently distributed error terms.
The bank failure literature suggests a set of
control variables that is likely to be important
in examining the relationship between SBA
leverage and performance, as measured by
profits or failure.14  We group these variables
as follows:
Asset composition and quality—The diver-
sification and quality of an SBIC’s asset port-
folio, as well as the share of loans in its securi-
ties portfolio, are likely to be related to profit-
ability (failure).  PCOMP, the ratio of loans to
portfolio securities, is a crude measure that
controls for asset risk.  SBICLOSS, the ratio of
loss provisions on accounts receivable to total
expenses, is a measure of asset quality and may
be negatively (positively) related to profitabili-
ty (failure).  Two diversification measures,
HERFGEO and HERFSIC2, are Herfindahl
indexes constructed from the flows of invest-
ments made by the SBIC over the 1983–92
period; HERFGEO (HERFSIC2) is based on
flows by state (two-digit SIC industry) of the
small business receiving funding.15  High levels
of diversification (low Herfindahls) may be
associated with high profitability (low failure),
but specialization can yield economies on
monitoring costs incurred by the SBIC; conse-
quently, the net effect of the Herfindahls on
profitability and failure is uncertain.  A related
measure is INSTATE, which is the share of
dollars invested by an SBIC in small businesses
located in its home state over the 1983–92
period.  High levels of INSTATE may mean
lower monitoring costs, thus higher profits
(lower failure) for an SBIC.
Other SBIC characteristics—SBIC size
(SBICSIZE), as measured by the natural loga-
rithm of total assets (TA), and age (SBICAGE)
are control variables, though standard argu-
ments are that large SBICs may be more diver-
sified and may hire better managers than small
ones.  We also include the ratio of operating
expenses to total assets (OPEX) to capture the
notion that efficient SBICs will earn superior
returns and be less likely to fail.
 Characteristics of the small businesses
being financed—We consider two features, the
dollar-weighted mean age of the small business-
es receiving funding by the SBIC (AGEFIRM);
and the share of dollar investments going to
firms with fewer than 50 employees (E1–49).
These measures also help to control for asset
risk, to the extent that smaller, younger firms are
riskier on average than are larger, older ones.
Projects being funded—We argue that the
types of projects funded by an SBIC are likely
to be correlated with its profitability (and fail-
ure).  Each investment made by an SBIC is
identified as being intended to finance a certain
type of project being undertaken by the small
business receiving funding, for example, re-
search and development, land acquisition, or
operating capital.  We grouped the ten possible
project types into three categories.  USETRANS
is defined as the share of dollars invested in
transactions-type projects, whose execution is
likely to involve little managerial discretion by
the small business and to require little monitor-
ing by the SBIC.  We include plant moderniza-
tion, debt consolidation, new building or plant,
machinery acquisition, and land acquisition
projects in this category.  USERELAT is defined
as the share of dollars invested in relation-
ship-type projects that are likely to involve
high levels of managerial discretion and SBICECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 22
monitoring.  We include acquisitions of existing
businesses, marketing, research and develop-
ment, and an other catch-all category here.
Finally, USEOPKAP is the share of dollars
invested in the last category, operating capital.
In principle, it is important to control for
the types of projects and financial characteris-
tics of the small businesses being financed by
SBICs when examining the relationship be-
tween SBA leverage and performance.  Hence,
TABLE 1
Characteristics of SBICs and their investments, 1986–91 means
Characteristics of SBICs Bank- Nonbank-
All SBICs owned owned
TA Total assets, $ mil 16.973 30.148*** 9.044
SBICAGE Age, years 12.527 11.466*** 13.166
SBICLIQ (Current assets–current liabilities)/total assets 0.300 0.361*** 0.263
SBICLOSS (Provisions for losses on
accounts receivable)/total expenses 0.034 0.024** 0.040
MARGIN Net investment income/total assets 0.032 0.037*** 0.029
OPEX Operating expenses/total assets 0.041 0.036*** 0.044
PCOMP (Loans/total securities), book value 0.382 0.165*** 0.511
ACOMP (Total securities/total assets), market value 0.616 0.571*** 0.644
SBATA SBA funds/total assets 0.333 0.152*** 0.441
SBAPRIV SBA funds/private capital 1.044 0.371*** 1.450
AGROW Growth rate of total assets, in logs 0.041 0.092*** 0.009
KIMPBA Cumulative realized profits net of
unrealized losses/private capital 0.820 0.126* 0.056
Characteristics of SBICs Bank- Nonbank-
All SBICs owned owned
AGEFIRM $-weighted mean age of firms
funded by an SBIC in each year 7.727 7.106* 8.102
USETRANS Share of invested funds in each year
 intended for transactions-type projects 0.214 0.135*** 0.260
USERELAT Share of invested funds in each year
intended for relationship-type projects 0.203 0.273*** 0.162
USEOPKAP Share of invested funds in each year
intended for operating capital projects 0.583 0.590 0.579
E1–49 Share of invested funds in each year
going to firms with 1–49 employees 0.651 0.563*** 0.703
E50–249 Share of invested funds in each year
going to firms with 50–249 employees 0.277 0.348*** 0.234
E–GE250 Share of invested funds in each year
going to firms with 250+ employees 0.073 0.088* 0.064
HERFSIC2 Herfindahl index, based on ten-year flows by
two-digit SIC industry of small businesses 0.524 0.492*** 0.543
HERFGEO Herfindahl index, based on ten-year flows by
location (state) of small businesses 0.692 0.657*** 0.714
INSTATE Share of invested funds going to small businesses
located in the same state as the SBIC 0.554 0.546 0.559
FSTSHR Share of invested funds in each year
going to firms receiving funding for the
first time from this SBIC 0.534 0.465*** 0.575
SHRMFG Share of invested funds in each year
going to firms in manufacturing sector 0.420 0.544*** 0.346
SHRTRANS Share of invested funds in each year
going to firms in transportation sector 0.084 0.061*** 0.098
SHRRET Share of invested funds in each year
going to firms in retail sector 0.147 0.068*** 0.195
SHRSVC Share of invested funds in each year
going to firms in services sector 0.186 0.192 0.182
Notes: Sample is 280 SBICs, 1986–91.  Total observations: 1,102.  Means are unweighted. *, **, and *** indicate means
for bank-owned SBIC differ significantly from means for nonbank-owned at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculations from data provided by the Small Business Administration.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 23
in the empirical specifications of equations
1 and 2, we include many of these measures as
control variables.
Comparison of means—Table 1 reports
the mean values of selected variables for all
SBICs and for the bank- and nonbank-owned
SBICs over the 1986–91 period.  First, com-
pared with nonbank-owned SBICs, bank-
owned SBICs were larger (SBICSIZE), more
equity-oriented (PCOMP), and more liquid
(SBICLIQ and ACOMP).  Second, as described
above in more detail, bank-owned SBICs used
less SBA leverage (SBATA and SBAPRIV).
Third, they funded larger firms (E1–49 and
E50–249) and more relationship-oriented
projects (USERELAT).  They also funded more
firms in the manufacturing and service sectors
and fewer in the transportation and retail sec-
tors.  Finally, bank-owned SBICs grew much
more rapidly than did nonbank-owned SBICs
from 1986 to 1991 (AGROW).
Performance of SBICs
The following equation provides a simple
empirical specification of the relationship
between ROE and selected financial variables:
where j,t denotes SBIC j in year t, DUMt
(t = 2,3,...,T) are time-specific binary variables,
other explanatory variables are as defined
earlier (see table 1 and text); and e  j,t is an error
term.16  PORTFOLIO is a vector of measures
of income-earning assets held by SBICs, and
we consider two alternative vectors detailed
below.  We estimate equation 3 using time-
series cross-sectional data from 1986 to 1991
for the full sample of SBICs and for the bank-
and nonbank-owned subsamples of SBICs.
To determine the relationship between
failure of SBICs and our explanatory variables,
we estimate the following logit model by maxi-
mum-likelihood procedures:
4) Prob(FAILUREj,t = 1) = f(Xj,t–2 b),
where FAILUREj,t is equal to one if an SBIC is
liquidated, voluntarily surrenders its license, or
has its license revoked and zero otherwise; Xj,t-2
is the vector of explanatory variables on the
right-hand side of equation 3; b is a vector of
parameter estimates for the independent vari-
ables Xj,t-2; and f is the log odds ratio.17
ROE results
Table 2 reports the results from regressing
ROE on our first SBALEV measure, SBATA,
and other variables, for the full sample as well
as separately for the bank-owned and nonbank-
owned SBICs.  Column 1 contains the results
on the simplest model estimated over the full
sample of 280 SBICs, 1986–91, where the
PORTFOLIO vector includes USETRANS and
USERELAT.  Two things stand out in column
1.  First, the relationship between SBA lever-
age and ROE is negative, even after controlling
for SBIC age, size, and portfolio composition,
and characteristics of projects and small busi-
nesses. Second, several, though not all, of the
other variables are significantly related to ROE.
In particular, the operating expense variable,
OPEX, has a significant negative correlation
with ROE, and asset quality, as measured by
SBICLOSS, has a modest negative effect.  The
share of investments going to transactions-type
projects and, to a lesser extent, the share going
to relationship-type projects are positively
correlated with ROE (recall that operating
capital is the excluded category).  The diversi-
fication measures HERFGEO and HERFSIC2 are
not significant, nor are INSTATE, AGEFIRM, or
E1–49.  Thus, there is little evidence that, once
portfolio characteristics are taken into account,
the types of small businesses funded by SBICs
are important correlates of profitability.
Columns 2 and 3, which report results
from the same regression estimated for the bank
and nonbank samples, show that SBICLOSS,
USETRANS, and USERELAT are important
only for the nonbank SBICs.  Given that the
effect of the loss variable is likely to be nil for
SBICs whose portfolios contain mostly equities
(losses on accounts receivable are not likely to
be related to the ultimate quality of the equities
held by the SBIC) and that banks do most of
their investing in the form of equity, the
SBICLOSS result is not surprising.  Why
USETRANS and USERELAT seem important
only for nonbank-owned SBICs is more of a
puzzle.  An alternative specification is presented
in columns 4–6 of table 2; here, the USETRANS
and USERELAT variables are replaced by
3) ROEj,t = k0 + S
T
t=2 k0,t DUMt + k1 SBICSIZEj,t
+ k2 SBICAGEj,t+ k3 SBICLOSSj,t
+ k4 PORTFOLIOj,t + k5 SBALEVj,t
+k6 OPEXj,t + k7 AGEFIRMj,t
+ k8E1–49j,t + k9 HERFGEOj
+ k10 HERFSIC2j + k11 INSTATEj + ej,t,ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 24
TABLE 2
The relationship between return on equity (ROE) and SBA leverage
Bank- Nonbank- Bank- Nonbank-
All SBICs owned owned All SBICs owned owned
INTERCEPT –0.477*** –0.665** –0.482** –0.461*** –0.698*** –0.454**
(0.149) (0.258) (0.190) (0.146) (0.255) (0.187)
SBICSIZE 0.035*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.037*** 0.046*** 0.046***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.011) (0.008) (0.014) (0.010)
SBICAGE 0.009 –0.000 0.000 0.000 –0.001 –0.000
(0.010) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
SBICLOSS –0.108 0.000 –0.200* –0.163** –0.055 –0.254**
(0.079) (0.123) (0.104) (0.079) (0.126) (0.104)
OPEX –0.993*** –0.896*** –1.03*** –0.903*** –0.756** –0.958***
(0.211) (0.326) (0.285) (0.210) (0.329) (0.285)
SBATA –0.238*** –0.221*** –0.380*** –0.286*** –0.242*** –0.415***
(0.032) (0.067) (0.047) (0.034) (0.068) (0.048)
AGEFIRM 0.000 –0.001 –0.000 –0.000 –0.001 –0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
USETRANS 0.080*** 0.022 0.099*** - - -
(0.029) (0.055) (0.033)
USERELAT 0.044 0.035 0.071* - - -
(0.030) (0.044) (0.043)
PCOMP - - - 0.119*** 0.122* 0.113***
(0.025) (0.064) (0.029)
E1–49 0.034 0.011 0.0450 0.007 –0.011 0.012
(0.026) (0.043) (0.034) (0.026) (0.044) (0.034)
HERFGEO 0.061 0.144 –0.011 0.010 0.114 –0.059
(0.063) (0.148) (0.070) (0.064) (0.147) (0.071)
HERFSIC2 –0.040 –0.003 –0.073 –0.035 0.027 –0.070
(0.045) (0.107) (0.051) (0.045) (0.108) (0.051)
INSTATE 0.012 –0.039 0.056 0.021 –0.035 0.054
(0.038) (0.073) (0.046) (0.038) (0.073) (0.046)
R
–2 0.12 0.06 0.17 0.13 0.07 0.18
N 1,102 414 688 1,102 414 688
Notes:  Sample is 280 SBICs, 1986–91.  Dependent variable:  ROE, 1986–91.  Each specification includes (unreported) time
dummies, and standard errors are in parentheses below coefficient estimates.   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculations from data provided by the Small Business Administration.
cance of the effect is dampened with the new
measure.  The regression results from using
DSBATA, in columns 4–6 of table 3, indicate
that increases in SBA leverage relative to total
assets affect ROE negatively only for nonbank-
owned SBICs, not bank-owned SBICs.  When
considered in light of the SBA leverage usage
patterns described above, this result is not
surprising.  Bank-owned SBICs were shedding
their already low levels of SBA leverage over
the 1986–91 period, while they were growing
rapidly and earning higher returns than non-
bank-owned SBICs.  The relationship between
leverage and ROE thus seems quite different
for the two types of SBICs.
PCOMP, the ratio of loans to securities at book
value.  Since USETRANS and PCOMP are high-
ly correlated (SBICs tend to finance transac-
tions-oriented projects with debt), we exclude
the USE variables in this specification.  The
main result is unchanged:  SBA leverage is
negatively related to ROE, even after control-
ling for other factors that may influence profit-
ability.
Next, we consider our two alternative
measures of SBA leverage, SBAPRIV and
DSBATA.  The results from using SBAPRIV
shown in columns 1–3 of table 3 are quite
similar to the results using SBATA in table 2,
columns 4–6:  SBA leverage has a significant
negative effect, though the statistical signifi-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 25
TABLE 3
The relationship between ROE and alternative measures of SBA leverage
Bank- Nonbank- Bank- Nonbank-
All SBICs owned owned All SBICs owned owned
INTERCEPT –0.743*** –0.835*** –0.854*** –0.708*** –0.852*** –0.588***
(0.145) (0.255) (0.195) (0.170) (0.317) (0.215)
SBICSIZE 0.049*** 0.053*** 0.061*** 0.042*** 0.049*** 0.035***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.009) (0.017) (0.012)
SBICAGE 0.001 –0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.012)
SBICLOSS –0.146* –0.031 –0.243** –0.124 0.027 –0.202*
(0.081) (0.128) (0.108) (0.091) (0.148) (0.119)
OPEX –0.916*** –0.753** –0.960*** –0.903*** –0.683* –1.02***
(0.215) (0.333) (0.296) (0.241) (0.393) (0.319)
DSBATA - - - –0.171** –0.030 –0.196***
(0.071) (0.175) (0.075)
SBAPRIV –0.043*** –0.046* –0.057*** - - -
(0.009) (0.025) (0.013)
AGEFIRM –0.000 –0.001 –0.001 0.001 –0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
PCOMP 0.092** 0.115* 0.094*** 0.032 0.065 0.047
(0.027) (0.067) (0.031) (0.028) (0.081) (0.032)
E1–49 0.012 –0.004 0.010 0.012 0.008 –0.005
(0.027) (0.044) (0.036) (0.032) (0.056) (0.040)
HERFGEO 0.050 0.090 0.013 0.029 0.114 –0.009
(0.065) (0.148) (0.073) (0.077) (0.191) (0.082)
HERFSIC2 –0.008 0.093 –0.043 0.043 0.140 0.022
(0.046) (0.107) (0.053) (0.054) (0.134) (0.059)
INSTATE 0.026 –0.037 0.063 0.038 –0.096 0.089*
(0.038) (0.074) (0.048) (0.046) (0.092) (0.054)
R –2 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.08 0.03 0.11
N 1,102 414 688 843 322 521
Notes:  Sample is 280 SBICs, 1986–91.  Dependent variable:  ROE, 1986–91.  Each specification includes (unreported) time
dummies, and standard errors are in parentheses below coefficient estimates.   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculations from data provided by the Small Business Administration.
Our principal finding from tables 2 and 3
is that after controlling for other factors that
can influence ROE, we still find a strong, neg-
ative relationship between SBA leverage and
profitability of SBICs.  Can we identify which
of the stories sketched above is most impor-
tant?  A report from the U.S. GAO (1993)
emphasizes both the mismatch effect and the
prepayment effect.  To investigate the mis-
match story, we reestimated equation 3, adding
an interaction term to the set of regressors—the
product of SBATA and PCOMP.  Our reason-
ing was that the sign of its coefficient would be
positive under the mismatch story, that is, the
negative effect of SBA leverage on ROE
would be most pronounced for SBICs with
low values of PCOMP (high shares of equi-
ties in their portfolios).  In fact, we do obtain
a positive coefficient estimate on this interac-
tion term, offering some support for the mis-
match story.18
To investigate the prepayment effect, we
reestimated equation 3, allowing the coeffi-
cient on SBA leverage to vary over time.  We
found statistically significant coefficients on
the time dummy–SBA leverage interaction
terms, suggesting that the prepayment story
may be important.  Next, we considered three
possible ways of identifying the contribution
from prepayment restrictions, and we found
little evidence that prepayment restrictions
were the source of the negative leverage-ROE
relationship.  Below, we briefly describe the
interest rate environment faced by SBICs dur-
ing our sample period and our findings on the
prepayment issue.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 26
Interest rates were high in the early 1980s
compared with the years covered by our study,
1986–91.  In the 1981–85 period, the ten-year
U.S. Treasury bond rate averaged 12.2 percent,
while over the 1986–91 period, it averaged
8.3 percent.  If SBICs were unable to refinance
their existing high-rate debt in the early years
of our sample period, their profitability may
have been adversely affected.  We argue that
this restriction, if important, should show up in
our analysis in any one of the following three
ways.  First, the impact of SBA leverage on
ROE should vary depending on whether inter-
est rates are high or low relative to previous
years.  When interest rates are falling, we
would expect the negative effect of SBA lever-
age to become more pronounced.  To address
this, we reestimated the ROE equation of table
2, columns 4–6, adding an interaction term for
SBA leverage and the change in the ten-year
Treasury rate.19  We found a negative coeffi-
cient on the interaction term, so that when
interest rates were falling in the early years of
our sample, the negative impact of SBA lever-
age on ROE was mitigated, not exacerbated as
the prepayment story would imply.
A second prepayment story emphasizes
that the cost of failing to refinance high-rate
debt is that though liabilities remain expensive,
the assets of SBICs earn lower returns in the
lower interest rate environment.  That is, if an
SBIC’s customers can refinance when rates fall
but the SBIC cannot, then the SBIC’s liabilities
remain costly, while its earnings on assets
decline.  Under this story, a measure of the
interest rate spread earned by an SBIC would
be a narrower and better measure of the net
earnings likely to be affected by a decline in
interest rates.  To investigate this, we reesti-
mated equation 3, now using an interest rate
spread as the dependent variable, including an
interaction term between SBA leverage and the
change in interest rates, and controlling for
macroeconomic conditions by including the
growth rate of real GDP.20  Again, we found no
evidence that leverage’s negative effect is most
pronounced when interest rates are falling.
Finally, we computed what each SBIC’s
interest expenses would have been had it refi-
nanced its entire stock of debt at the current
year’s ten-year Treasury rate.  The prepayment
story implies that SBICs whose actual interest
expenses greatly exceeded these imputed ex-
penses (measured by the difference between
actual and computed interest expenses relative
to total assets) are those for whom the prepay-
ment restrictions are most burdensome; thus,
we should see low ROEs for these SBICs.
The simple correlation between ROE and this
difference measure is indeed negative.21  How-
ever in a regression of ROE on the same vari-
ables as in table 2 columns 4–6, plus this dif-
ference measure, the measure comes in strong-
ly significant but with a positive coefficient,
not a negative one.  Again, this evidence does
not support the prepayment story.
In summary, we have little evidence that
the prepayment restrictions faced by SBICs
during our sample period are the main source
of the negative relationship between SBA
leverage and ROE.  However, we do find some
support for the idea that the regular interest
payments due on SBA leverage adversely af-
fected profits at equity-oriented SBICs.  More
research is needed to consider the relative
importance of other possible explanations for
the negative ROE–SBA leverage relationship.
Failure results
Table 4 reports the results from the estima-
tion of equation 4 for the full sample and the
bank- and nonbank-owned samples.  The first
column for each sample presents the maximum
likelihood estimates of the parameters and their
standard errors.  The second column reports the
marginal effects of the explanatory variables
on the probability of failure.
Consistent with the ROE results, SBA
leverage measured by SBATA is negatively
correlated with SBIC performance:  SBICs
with higher SBATA have a higher probability
of failure two years hence.  Furthermore, the
positive relationship between SBA leverage
and probability of failure is stronger for non-
banks.  While an increase in SBATA increases
the probability of failure for a bank-owned
SBIC by 0.125, a similar increase in SBATA
increases the probability of failure for a non-
bank-owned SBIC by 0.187.
The correlations between failure and
SBICSIZE and SBICLOSS are also consistent
with the earlier results.  SBICSIZE is negatively
correlated with the probability of failure in all
samples.  SBICLOSS is positively correlated
with the probability of failure, but has a signif-
icant effect only for the full sample.  In the full
and nonbank samples, higher ratios of loans toFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 27
TABLE 4
The relationship between the probability of failure and SBA leverage
All SBICs Nonbank-owned Bank-owned
MLE PROB MLE PROB MLE PROB
Constant 2.921 0.238 2.094 0.212 3.713 0.168
SBICSIZE –0.375*** –0.031*** –0.308** –0.031** –0.468** –0.021**
(0.116) (0.144) (0.231)
SBICAGE 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.013) (0.015) (0.029)
PCOMP –0.525* –0.043* –0.670** –0.068** 0.891 0.040
(0.294) (0.340) (0.748)
SBICLOSS 1.366* 0.111* 0.772 0.078 1.747 0.079
(0.810) (1.084) (1.347)
SBATA 2.021*** 0.165*** 1.850*** 0.187*** 2.767*** 0.125***
(0.423) (0.592) (0.843)
OPEX 4.537** 0.370** 6.308** 0.639** 3.969 0.179
(2.241) (2.947) (3.824)
AGEFIRM –0.011 –0.001 –0.014 –0.001 –0.014 –0.001
(0.014) (0.016) (0.029)
E1–49 0.068 0.006 –0.139 –0.014 0.517 0.023
(0.329) (0.392) (0.665)
HERFGEO –0.843 –0.069 –0.665 –0.067 –2.900 –0.131
(0.769) (0.872) (2.051)
HERFSIC2 0.953* 0.078* 0.784 0.079 2.844* 0.128*
(0.531) (0.623) (1.460)
INSTATE 0.097 0.008 0.071 0.007 0.552 0.025
(0.461) (0.550) (1.019)
c2(16) 79.78*** 44.09*** 42.98***
N 1,102 688 414
Notes:  The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if an SBIC failed two years hence;
otherwise, it takes on a value of zero.  Failure is defined as either liquidation or revocation of license by the SBA, or
surrender of license by an SBIC.  SBATA is the ratio of SBA funds divided by total assets.  In addition to the above
explanatory variables, the model also includes time dummies for the years 1987–91.  The MLE column presents the
maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters and their standard errors.  The PROB column presents the marginal
effects of the right-hand side variables (X) on the probability of failure, computed at the mean values of X.  *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source:  Authors’ calculations from data provided by the Small Business Administration.
total portfolio securities (PCOMP) are associ-
ated with lower probabilities of failure.  On the
other hand, PCOMP is not significant in the
bank-owned sample.  This result is comparable
to the ROE results reported above.
Higher operating expenses are associated
with higher probabilities of failure, and this
relationship is particularly strong for the non-
bank-owned SBICs.  Taken together with earli-
er results on ROE, these results indicate that
high operating expenses are associated with
low profitability contemporaneously for all
SBICs.  For nonbank SBICs, high operating
expenses are also associated with poor long-
term performance, which suggests that the
consequences of operating inefficiencies at
nonbank-owned SBICs are more persistent.
Among the variables that describe the
investment strategy of SBICs, only the indus-
try-diversification measure, HERFSIC2, is
significantly related to probability of failure.
SBICs that are not diversified are more likely
to fail than well-diversified SBICs; however,
the relationship is significant only for the
bank-owned SBICs.
Alternative views of failure
As Kane (1985, 1989) and others have
recognized, failure of institutions with access
to government liability-guarantees is not an
automatic consequence of a weakened financial
condition.  It results from a conscious decisionECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 28
by the regulatory agency to acknowledge and
act upon the weakened financial condition of
an institution.  Our definition of SBIC failure
combines three different events, liquidation,
revocation, and surrender of license.  Liquida-
tion and revocation are generally thought to be
choices of the SBA, while surrender of license
is a choice of the SBIC.  How sensitive are our
results about SBA leverage to our definition of
failure?  When we reestimated equation 4 on
the sample of SBICs consisting of survivors
and those who were liquidated during our sam-
ple period, we obtained results very similar to
the ones described above.  However, using a
sample consisting of survivors and those who
surrender their licenses over the sample period
yields different results:  SBA leverage is no
longer a statistically significant correlate of the
probability of failure, where failure is defined
as the surrender of a license.
The positive leverage–failure correlation
in the liquidation sample reflects both an eco-
nomic and a regulatory effect of leverage, and
without further work, we cannot disentangle
the two.  Since leverage is not an important
correlate of failure in the surrenders-only sam-
TABLE 5
The relationship between the probability of failure and SBA leverage,
including SBA’s measure of cumulative profitability
All SBICs Nonbank-owned Bank-owned
MLE PROB MLE PROB MLE PROB
Constant 1.215 0.093 0.264 0.025 2.489 0.103
SBICSIZE –0.267** –0.203** –0.189 –0.018 –0.385 –0.016*
(0.116) (0.145) (0.239)
SBICAGE 0.010 0.001 0.018 0.002 0.011 0.000
(0.013) (0.015) (0.029)
PCOMP –0.142 –0.011 –0.307 –0.029 1.546* 0.064*
(0.321) (0.364) (0.859)
SBICLOSS 1.464* 0.112* 0.904 0.084 1.711 0.071
(0.809) (1.121) (1.342)
SBATA 1.342*** 0.102*** 0.880 0.082 2.215** 0.091**
(0.459) (0.642) (0.883)
OPEX 3.081 0.235 4.190 0.391 3.086 0.127
(2.226) (3.033) (3.607)
AGEFIRM –0.010 –0.001 –0.015 –0.001 –0.011 –0.001
(0.014) (0.017) (0.029)
E1–49 0.108 0.008 –0.062 –0.006 0.495 0.020
(0.329) (0.391) (0.670)
HERFGEO –0.765 –0.058 –0.392 –0.037 –3.344 –0.138
(0.766) (0.882) (2.094)
HERFSIC2 1.018* 0.078* 0.763 0.071 3.165** 0.131**
(0.538) (0.637) (1.505)
INSTATE 0.098 0.007 0.085 0.008 0.593 0.024
(0.465) (0.558) (1.017)
KIMPBA –1.134*** –0.086*** –1.393*** –0.130 –1.111 –0.458*
(0.362) (0.454) (0.687)
 c2(17) 90.45*** 54.56*** 45.75***
N 1,102 688 414
Notes:  The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if an SBIC failed two years hence;
otherwise, it takes on a value of zero.  Failure is defined as either liquidation or revocation of license by the SBA, or
surrender of license by an SBIC.  SBATA is the ratio of SBA funds divided by total assets.  In addition to the above
explanatory variables, the model also includes time dummies for the years 1987–91.  The MLE column presents the
maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters and their standard errors.  The PROB column presents the marginal
effects of the right-hand side variables (X) on the probability of failure, computed at the mean values of X.  *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source:  Authors’ calculations from data provided by the Small Business Administration.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 29
ple, a sample for which regulatory determi-
nants of failure were presumably not impor-
tant, the economic effect seems to be nil.  How
can we reconcile this result with our claims
about the economic effects of leverage?  First,
the distinction between liquidations and surren-
ders in practice is not as clear as our discussion
has implied.  An SBIC may surrender its license
just before facing a certain liquidation action
by the SBA.  Similarly, liquidations may occur
for purely economic reasons.  For example, the
U.S. GAO (1993) reported that several SBICs
entered liquidation to avoid the prepayment
penalties associated with paying off their SBA
leverage.  So, we do not view liquidations as
purely regulatory events, nor surrenders as
purely economic events.  Second, we have
other evidence from our ROE analysis that the
negative effect of SBA leverage on perfor-
mance remains even when the sample consists
only of survivors and surrenders, that is, when
SBICs that ultimately are liquidated are removed
from the sample.  Estimating equation 3 on this
other sample still yields a significant, negative
coefficient on SBA leverage, which is consis-
tent with there being an economic effect of
leverage on performance.  In summary, though
we cannot gauge the quantitative importance of
the economic effects of leverage versus any
regulatory impact coming through the SBA’s
closure rule, we feel confident that the positive
coefficient on leverage in the failure equations
truly reflects the negative economic impact of
leverage on performance.
Finally, as noted earlier, the SBA consid-
ers an SBIC to be a poor performer if net real-
ized losses plus unrealized losses of the SBIC
exceed 50 percent of its private capital.  If an
SBIC is capital impaired by this measure, the
SBA considers the SBIC in default and has the
right to liquidate its assets.  Table 5 reports the
results from the estimation of equation 4 when
the SBA’s measure of performance, KIMPBA,
is included in the model as another explanatory
variable.22  The greater the SBA’s exposure to
losses, the more likely it is to take actions to
close an investment company.  Thus, we expect
that the probability of SBIC failure will increase
with SBA leverage and with the degree of capi-
tal impairment.
We find that SBICs that perform well by
the SBA’s standards are indeed less likely to
fail; this relationship is particularly strong for
the nonbank-owned SBICs.  For nonbank-
owned SBICs, including KIMPBA in the model
dampens the relationship between probability
of failure and SBA leverage.  Because most of
the nonbank-owned SBICs take advantage of
SBA subsidies, it is not surprising that SBA
closure decisions are related more to the finan-
cial condition of these SBICs than to the level
of their SBA funding.  On the other hand, SBA
leverage remains a significant correlate of
probability of failure for bank-owned SBICs,
even after KIMPBA is included.  Since there
are significant differences across bank-owned
SBICs in the use of SBA funding, it is not
surprising that the level of SBA funding, as
well as their financial condition, is significant-
ly correlated with the probability of failure for
these SBICs.
Conclusion
Encouraging financial institutions to pro-
vide funding to small businesses has been a
central goal of U.S. public policy for a long
time.  The SBIC program is designed to en-
courage the flow of long-term capital to small
firms.  Because government guarantees are
used to fund many of the companies licensed
under the program, their performance is of
particular interest to policymakers.
In this article, we analyze the performance
of 280 SBICs that were active at the beginning
of 1986, paying special attention to the impact
of access to government liability guarantees on
ROE and failure.  We find that SBICs performed
poorly.  Of the 280 SBICs, over half had failed
by 1993.  The ROE measure reveals a similarly
dismal performance.
We find that high usage of SBA-guaranteed
debt is associated with poor performance, partic-
ularly for nonbank-owned SBICs.  We describe
several factors that may account for this rela-
tionship and offer evidence on two of them, the
prepayment effect and the mismatch effect.  We
find little evidence that prepayment restrictions
faced by SBICs are important factors behind the
poor performance record of SBICs, but we do
find evidence that equity-oriented SBICs found
SBA leverage burdensome due to its regular
interest payment requirements.  Our results are
also consistent with information-related prob-
lems (adverse selection and moral hazard)
being important.  However, our results are not
sufficiently precise to differentiate these infor-
mation-related effects of leverage from itsECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 30
other effects.  Nevertheless, the results suggest
that public subsidies aimed at encouraging the
flow of funds to small firms may have unin-
tended consequences if the assets funded by
SBICs are riskier than they would have been in
the absence of the subsidy.
Finally, we note that in 1994 the SBA
revised many regulations pertaining to the
SBIC program.  For example, minimum private
capital requirements were raised, prepayment
restrictions were lifted, and a new equity-like
form of leverage was developed and made
available to equity-oriented SBICs.  Our analy-
sis suggests that the latter change may be quite
valuable and that lifting the prepayment restric-
tions may be less so.  Furthermore, higher
capital requirements could, in principle, miti-
gate some of the information-related problems
that characterized the program in earlier years.
However, a complete assessment of the likely
impact of the new regulations on the perfor-
mance of SBICs must wait for future research.
NOTES
1Initially, the Small Business Administration was estab-
lished as a temporary government agency to provide
intermediate-term financing to small firms.  In 1958,
Congress made the SBA a permanent government agency.
For a discussion, see Osborn (1975).
2The SBA’s Statistical Package reports that 1,361 SBICs
were licensed over the 1959–94 period.  Of these, 455 (33
percent) were transferred into liquidation between 1967
and 1994.
3For example, bank failures generated losses to the FDIC
of about $40 billion.  For thrifts, the loss was near $200
billion, most of which was beyond the resources of the
deposit insurer and was thus charged to taxpayers. For a
discussion of the magnitude of the bank and thrift debacle
of the 1980s, see Bartholomew (1993) and Kaufman
(1995).  Over the 1985–89 period, the cost to the FDIC to
close failing commercial banks averaged about 17 cents
per dollar of failed bank assets.  See Barth, Brumbaugh,
and Litan (1992) for a discussion of resolution costs
associated with bank failures.  For the now defunct Feder-
al Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, the cost to
close failing S&Ls averaged about 33 cents per dollar of
assets over the 1985–89 period.  See Barth (1991) for the
numbers used to compute the cost per dollar of assets.
4In 1994, the SBA put into effect new regulations that were
significantly different from those in effect over the 1986–
91 period.  In this article, we focus on the regulation during
the 1986–91 period.  In 1976, the program was extended to
include specialized SBICs (SSBICs) that provide funds to
small firms owned by “economically disadvantaged per-
sons.”  In this article, we focus only on regular SBICs,
leaving an analysis of SSBICs for a future study.
5Under certain circumstances, SBICs can obtain up to $4
in SBA funds for every $1 of private capital, up to a
maximum amount of $35 million.
6The general partners are usually liable for all obligations
of a partnership. Thus, the liability structure offered by
the SBA is a departure from this norm and offers a relief
to general partners.
7If the SBIC provides a plan of divestiture, it can maintain a
controlling interest in a small business up to seven years.
8Limits on interest rates that can be charged to small
businesses are effective for all SBICs, whether or not they
use SBA leverage.
9The SBA’s SBIC Statistical Package reports that there
were 335 reporting SBICs in 1986.
10Specifically, the financial statements pertain to the fiscal
years 1987–92.
11Our definition of SBIC failure is not exactly comparable
with that used for banks and savings and loan associations
(S&Ls).  For SBICs, we define failure as liquidation,
revocation, or voluntary surrender of license.  Few, if any,
banks or S&Ls voluntarily surrender their charters, and
the numbers in figure 1 exclude these voluntary surren-
ders.  If our definition of SBIC failure included only
liquidations, the results would still indicate a higher
failure rate for SBICs.
12An SBIC is classified as bank-owned in any year in
which at least 10 percent of its equity was controlled by a
banking organization.  Otherwise, the SBIC is classified
as nonbank-owned.
13This would be true if the mean duration of equity
investments was greater than the mean duration of debt
investments.
14Sinkey (1975), Altman (1977), and Martin (1977)
analyze financial ratios constructed from balance sheets
and income statements to develop a system to help regula-
tors identify financially troubled institutions as early as
possible.  These financial ratios were grouped into five
broad categories: capital adequacy, asset quality, manage-
ment competence, earnings, and liquidity.  The same
types of broad categories were used by Avery and Han-
weck (1984), Barth et al. (1985), Benston (1985), and
Gajewski (1989) to examine the likelihood of an institu-
tion’s closure.  Cole (1993) examines economic insolven-
cy and closure using a larger number of financial factors
than in the previous studies.  For an excellent review of
the literature on bank failure, see Demirgüc-Kunt (1989).
15The Herfindahl index is often used to measure competi-
tion in banking markets.  It is calculated as the sum of the
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coefficient of –0.281 on SBATA; for SBICs with zero
loans in their portfolios, the total coefficient is –0.326.
Analyzing bank-owned and nonbank-owned SBICs
separately, we find that the interaction coefficient is
positive and significant at the 1 percent level for only the
nonbank-owned SBICs.
19We controlled for macroeconomic conditions by includ-
ing the growth rate of real GDP in this regression, as well
as in all the other regressions described in this section on
prepayment restrictions; thus, time dummies are not
included as in equation 3.
20We defined the interest rate spread as the difference
between the interest rate received by the SBIC (interest
income relative to interest-earning assets) and the interest
rate paid by the SBIC (interest expenses relative to total
debt owed by the SBIC).
21We recognize that we cannot exclude the possibility that
a large difference may occur for some SBICs because they
are currently poor performers that wish to avoid the
scrutiny associated with refinancing.  Though the SBA
may not explicitly price risk when it sets interest rates on
its debentures, it may indirectly penalize a poorly per-
forming SBIC in other ways when the SBIC requests new
funding.
22This analysis uses our original definition of SBIC failure.
If the index is equal to one, little or no diversification (or
competition) in the market is present, and the smaller the
index the more diversified (or competitive) the market.
Here, HERFSIC2, for example, is calculated as the sum of
squared shares of funding in a particular SIC code to the
total fundings made by an SBIC over the 1982–92 period.
Similarly, the shares of investments made by an SBIC by
state are used to calculate the HERFGEO index.
16Recall that HERFGEO and HERFSIC2 are computed
over the full ten-year period, 1983–92, as opposed to
separately for each year.  Our method implicitly as-
sumes a ten-year duration for the investments made by
SBICs, whereas the year-by-year method assumes a
one-year duration.
17Many failed SBICs are missing financial records for the
year preceding failure.  Consequently, we focus on two-
year ahead failure prediction in the models we present
below.  Once we discard the available observations per-
taining to the year before failure, as well as four observa-
tions with data problems, we have 1,102 observations, of
which 414 (688) are classified as bank-owned (nonbank-
owned) SBICs.
18Our coefficient (standard error) estimates are –0.326
(0.044) on the SBATA variable and 0.119 (0.083) on the
SBATA–PCOMP interaction variable.  At the sample
mean of PCOMP, which is 0.381, this implies a total
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